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This article aims to establish a connection between the political economy of the reform process in Sub-
Saharan African countries and the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It focuses 
on the impact of IMF conditionality on the internal factors of the government decision-making process 
to reform. The paper examines the relationship between a government’s decision to turn to the IMF for 
assistance and the opposition capacity of interest groups. This link is tested through the estimation of a 
duration model, where the periods without agreement between the IMF and countries constitute the 
dependent variable. Parametric and non-parametric analyses show that economic factors are not the 
only ones that are taken into account by a government to request an IMF arrangement. The anticipated 
reaction of interest groups opposed to reforms can be an incentive for the government to request the 
intervention of the IMF. As an external actor, the IMF can initiate and support reforms with high 




L’objectif de  cet article est de lier l’économie politique du processus de réforme dans les pays 
d’Afrique Subsaharienne à la problématique de l’intervention du Fonds Monétaire International (FMI). 
Il vise à mettre en évidence l’impact des conditionnalités du FMI sur les facteurs internes de prise de 
décision par le gouvernement de réformer, en examinant la relation entre la décision du gouvernement 
d’avoir recours au FMI et la capacité de d’opposition des groupes d’intérêt. Ce lien est analysé en 
estimant un modèle de durée, dans lequel les périodes sans accord entre le FMI et le pays constituent 
la variable expliquée. Les analyses paramétriques et non-paramétriques montrent que les facteurs 
économiques ne sont pas les seuls à être pris en compte par les gouvernements pour demander un 
arrangement avec le FMI. Les anticipations relatives aux réactions des groupes d’intérêt opposés aux 
réformes peuvent constituer une incitation pour le gouvernement d’avoir recours au Fonds. En effet, 
en tant qu’acteur externe, le FMI peut être en mesure d’initier et de soutenir des réformes ayant un 
coût politique important, qu’un gouvernement peu assuré de son pouvoir ne peut mettre en œuvre de 
lui-même. 
 
Keywords: Interest Groups, IMF, Conditionality, Sub-Saharan Africa, Duration Models 
 
JEL: C14, C41, F33, F34, F4, O55 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
 
  2 
 
 
Contents          Page 
   
 
I.  Introduction ............................................................................................................ 3 
II.  Descriptive analysis and presentation of the duration models ............................... 4 
II.1. Descriptive analysis of the dependent variable ........................................... 4 
II.2. Economic duration data analysis: the method ............................................. 7 
II.2.a. The basic functions .......................................................................... 7 
II.2.b. Non-parametric estimations  ............................................................ 9 
II.2.c. Semi-parametric estimations: proportional hazards models .......... 10 
II.2.d. Parametric estimations: accelerated lifetime models ..................... 10 
III.  Estimation............................................................................................................. 10 
III.1. Non-parametric analysis of the durations of periods without  
         IMF agreement ......................................................................................... 10 
III.2. Parametric analysis  .................................................................................. 14 
III.2.a. Methodological specifications  ..................................................... 15 
III.2.b. Exogenous variables  .................................................................... 15 
III.2.c. Results of estimations  .................................................................. 18 
III.2.d. Interpretation of the results .......................................................... 20 
IV.  Conclusion  ........................................................................................................... 22 
Annex 1:  Composition of the sample of the parametric study ......................................23  
Annex 2:  Ramsey-Reset test ........................................................................................ 25 
Annex 3:  Test of absence of non-observable heterogeneity  ........................................ 27 
References ..................................................................................................................... 28 
Figures 
2.1  IMF programs with Sub-Saharan African countries................................................ 5 
2.2  Right-censored data.................................................................................................. 8 
Graphs 
3.1  Probability to remain without IMF agreement....................................................... 11 
3.2  Probability to remain without IMF agreement and number of months with  
        agreement before ................................................................................................... 12 
3.3  Probability to remain without IMF agreement and ethno-linguistic     
        fractionalization..................................................................................................... 14 
Tables 
3.1   Probability to remain without IMF agreement....................................................... 11 
3.2   Regression of duration models, 1971-98............................................................... 20  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
 
  3 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the world economy experienced severe shocks that had 
damaging consequences for Sub-Saharan African countries. The surge of oil prices in 1979 
and 1980, the world recession, increases of interest rates, and debt crises slowed their 
economic growth (World Bank, 1989 and 1994). This period was also characterized by 
inadequate domestic economic policies which aggravated their macroeconomic disequilibria. 
Most of Sub-Saharan African countries that did not request assistance from the IMF before 
1980, had to apply later on for arrangements with the Fund to overcome the degradation of 
their financial situation (Helleiner, 1983; IMF, 1985; Guillaumont and Guillaumont-
Jeanneney, 1994). 
 
To address this situation, the IMF adapted its instruments to the needs of member countries. 
Its intervention in Sub-Saharan African countries involved an increase in its financial 
assistance and an extension of its commitments to the region. The Fund developed 
stabilization and adjustment programs with strong macroeconomic conditionality focusing on 
management and stabilization of demand and increase and reorientation of supply. These 
programs had important impacts on domestic income distribution and therefore involved 
political costs for governments concerned about the reaction of the population and interest 
groups. A government decision to request IMF assistance is thus not only an economic one 
but also a political one (Nelson, 1984; Killick, 1985; Thomas and Grindle, 1990; De Janvry et 
al., 1991). 
 
The objective of this study is to identify the determinants of the duration of periods without 
agreement between the IMF and Sub-Saharan African countries. The set of explanatory 
variables includes country-specific and time-specific characteristics that are likely to be 
determinants of either a country’s decision to seek Fund assistance, or the macroeconomic 
policy actions that are likely to lead to Fund approval of financial arrangement. Besides these 
economic and institutional determinants, the study also takes into account the effect of the 
opposition capacity of interest groups on the government decision-making process to request 
IMF assistance and to reform. The objective of the estimation of this duration model is to 
measure how interest groups affect the government capacity to sign an agreement with the 
IMF and therefore the length of periods without agreement. 
 
Compared to the research already conducted on the determinants of IMF financial 
arrangements (Bird and Orme, 1981; Goldstein and Montiel, 1986; Cornelius, 1987; Joyce, 
1992; Conway, 1994; Bird, 1995; Knight and Santaella, 1997), this study has a new approach 
in two ways. First, the role of interest groups in delaying reforms is explicitly included in the 
empirical analysis. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization index is used as a proxy of the 
society’s polarization and the degree of social conflict. Second, unlike previous research, this 
study takes into account the concept of duration, which is central to understanding the effects 
of the institutional environment and opposition capacity of interest groups. Indeed, the 
duration of the negotiation process is the best indicator of the obstacles that a government has 
to overcome to conclude such an arrangement and to implement reforms.  
In the following section of this paper, a descriptive analysis of the dependent variable is 
conducted and methodological specifications are  given about the analysis of economic 
duration data. The third section presents the results of the parametric and non-parametric 
analyses, and the final section is the conclusion.  
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II.  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF THE DURATION MODELS 
 
II.1. Descriptive analysis of the dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable studied in this empirical analysis is the duration of periods without 
agreement between the IMF and Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1971-1998. 
The observation period starts when the Bretton Woods monetary system collapsed, which is 
the beginning of the evolution of the IMF’s role, and it ends the last year allowed by the 
availability of data.  
 
An inventory of all the financial agreements between Sub-Saharan African countries and the 
IMF has been made, but only those which involve conditions of economic policy have been 
considered in our empirical analysis
3: Stand-by Agreements (SBA), Extended Fund Facilities 
(EFF), Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF), and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
facilities (ESAF). Data on these agreements by country is presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Some arrangements were canceled, either because they were interrupted before the initial 
expiration date, or because they were replaced by another type of arrangement. Others were 
undrawn, often reflecting the decision of the recipient government. For instance, in June 1980 
Gabon signed an EFF in the amount of SDR34 million, which remained undrawn. The 
Gabonese government’s objective was to give to the international financial markets proof of 
its willingness to implement sound macroeconomic policies. Also, in the case of Nigeria, 
efforts to pursue structural adjustment have been supported by three SBAs between 1986 and 
1992. The amounts committed under IMF arrangements reached SDR1.44 billion; however, 
after organizing a referendum, the Nigerian government decided to leave the arrangements 
undrawn.  
 
In selecting the data for this study, the following arrangements were made. First, if an 
agreement was interrupted, the interruption date rather than the original end date of the 
program was used as the start of the period without a program. Second, countries with 
agreements with the IMF were considered as having an agreement, even if no disbursements 
were made. Third, since most of the independent variables are observed on an annual basis, 
the same annual periodicity for the duration of periods without agreement was kept. A rule 
was used to deal with cases where duration was less than a year. Periods without agreement 
for more than six months were counted as a full year. Periods without agreement for less than 
six months were not counted, assuming that a brief interruption corresponds with necessary 
time for negotiations with the IMF. 
                                                 
3 The arrangements with low conditionality like the temporary oil facilities were not included.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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Figure 2.1, which gives the time distribution of arrangements per country, shows that the 
arrangements are concentrated in the last 20 years. Due to the intensification of 
macroeconomic disequilibria during the 1980s, the assistance programs of the IMF were 
adopted to the needs of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
Many countries did not apply for IMF assistance before the 1980s. This pattern suggested that 
this study should distinguish between periods before first arrangements and periods between 
two arrangements. The average duration of the periods in both categories is significantly 
different: 11 years for the periods before the first arrangements and three years for the periods 
between two arrangements. 
 
The final sample includes 146 observations of periods without agreements.  The number of 
observations per country varies and the duration ranges from one to 28 years (the latter is 
Botswana which has never requested IMF assistance). The average of the sample is 5.47 years 
and the standard deviation is 5.83. These observed durations are the dependent variable of the 
following parametric and non-parametric analyses. Before presenting the results of those 
analyses, the theoretical foundations of economic duration data analysis are described.       
    
 
II.2. Economic duration data analysis: the method   
 
II.2.a. The basic functions 
 
The method of econometric analysis of duration data first appears in the 1930s. It was then 
essentially used for biostatistics (to estimate the survival duration of species), physics (to 
estimate the resistance of materials), and medicine (to estimate human lifetimes). Quite 
recently, the method’s application to economic data has concerned mainly the duration of 
unemployment (Mortensen, 1986). It has also been applied to macroeconomics, in particular 
for the estimation of models of endogenous growth.   
 
Duration could a priori be treated like any other continuous variable and be estimated with 
the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, the econometric estimation of 
duration with OLS creates some problems relative to the nature of the dependent variable: 
(i)  The duration is always positive or equal to zero, whereas OLS errors have a normal 
distribution from minus infinity to plus infinity. 
(ii)  The possibility that at the end of the sample period, some countries are within a 
period without agreement (the survey interrupts spells still in progress). In this case, 
information on the total duration of the period is not available, but only on the elapsed 
duration of this spell up to the end of the sample period (See Figure 2.2, case 3 and 5). Those 
observations of duration are right-censored. The elapsed duration is always inferior to the 
total duration; therefore the censoring problem can be the cause of bias of estimation. 
 
To take into account and estimate the values associated with individuals whose duration is not 
completed at the last period of observation, it is necessary to use the method of duration 
models. The data for this study present these characteristics, since in 1998, the year of the last 
observation in our sample, some countries remain without agreement with IMF. The length of 
this situation is unknown
4. 
                                                 
4 Since several durations for a same event for a same country are available, the method of transition model 
should be used. It would allow taking into account the eventual dependence of different durations between each 
other.  However, given the constraint of degrees of freedom, the assumption has be made that the different CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
 
  8 
 
 
In duration models, elapsed time is considered as the result of a stochastic process, and not as 
a continuous quantitative variable like in OLS. The central concept in these statistical 
methods is not dealing with the unconditional probability of an event taking place (e.g. the 
probability of a country without agreement with the IMF exactly one year), but with its 
conditional probability (e.g. the probability of a country continuing without an agreement in 
the second year given that it has already been without agreement for one year). The duration 
model takes into account the dates of status change: in this case, the dates when countries 




 Right-censored data 
 
 
Two major functions exist to characterize the distribution of a duration: the survivor function 
and the hazard function. 
 





t F du u f t S ) ( 1 ) ( ) (  
with  ) (t f  being the probability density and F(t) its distribution function.  
The Hazard function gives us the probability that spells will be completed at duration t, given 






t h =  
 
For this study, h(t) represents the conditional probability that a country signs an agreement 
with the IMF at duration t, given that the country remained without agreement until t.  
 
To estimate hazard functions, non-parametric methods can be used. But to determine the 
influence of exogenous variables, parametric or semi-parametric models have to be used. 
                                                                                                                                                        
durations are independent (Cf. section III.2.a). The method of duration model will be used instead of the method 
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  II.2.b. Non-parametric estimations 
 
The first category of models, non-parametric, allows an estimation of the exit probability out 
of the status of countries without agreements, at each period and for the whole sample. Due to 
the observed exit rate, these models calculate the exit probability for the right-censored data. 
The advantage of these models is that they do not necessitate postulating a specific 
distribution.  
 
The most commonly used model is the Kaplan-Meier, based on an empirical distribution 
function. In the case with no censoring, the survivor in t is estimated by: 
S(t) = 1 – F(t)    with F(t) = nt / N 
 
This estimated survivor function can be presented as a product of conditional probabilities: 
￿ ￿
< £




i i q t T t T P t T P t S
i
) 1 ( ) 1 / ( ) ( ) (  
with qj the exit probability at tj. This probability is then equal to 1 / (N – j + 1), since we 
observe an exit at j among the N – (j - 1) countries which “survive” right after tj-1.  
 
A modification is required to allow for censoring. Let  rj be the number of spells neither 
completed nor censored before duration  tj. The Kaplan-Meier estimator for the hazard 
function is dj / rj  (the number of “failures” at duration tj divided by the number “at risk” at 







r d t S ) / 1 ( ) (  
 
Basically, this estimator is obtained by setting  the estimated conditional probability of 
completing a spell (signing an agreement with the IMF) at tj equal to the observed relative 
frequency of completion at tj. These estimations can be done for different groups of countries 
and some tests can be performed to check whether there are significant different durations 
between groups. 
To explain the origin of these differences, we must use parametric or semi-parametric models. 
Parametric survival analysis involves detailed knowledge of the likely distribution of the 
survival time, whereas semi-parametric method (the Cox proportional hazard model) does not 
require the same detailed knowledge of the distribution of the hazard function.   
 
 
II.2.c. Semi-parametric estimations (Cox): proportional hazards models 
 
In the proportional hazards model, the exogenous variables have the same influence on the 
exit probability regardless of the duration (Cox, 1972). A variation of  x% of one variable 
causes a variation of  y% of the hazard function at any period of time. Thus  the hazard 
function for each period is: 
) , ( ) ( ) ( 0 b f X t h t h =    
with h0(t) the “basic” hazard, i.e. the hazard when all the explicative variables are equal to 
zero.  ) , ( b f X  is a positive function of exogenous variables  X and  b  is a vector of 
parameters. Usually,  ) exp( ) , ( b b f X X =  is assumed. 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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This specification assumes that the effect of exogenous variables X on the conditional exit 
probability does not depend on time. If different values of X correpond to distinct types of 
individuals, the ratio of hazard rates between two individuals is constant over time (but 
depends on these individuals’ characteristics).      
 
 
III.2.d. Parametric estimations: accelerated lifetime models 
 
In the accelerated lifetime models, the exogenous variables have a scale parameter over the 
duration, meaning that the effect of regressors is to rescale the time axis. Therefore the 
influence of an exogenous variable on the exit probability can change over time.   
 
The most common parametric hazard functions are Exponential, Weibull, Log-Logistic, and 
Log-Normal. The survivor and hazard functions for each of them are as follow: 
 
•  Exponential     q = ) (t h   (constant hazard)     ) . exp( ) ( t t S q - =  
 
•  Weibull     
1 . ) (
- =
a aq t t h         ) . exp( ) (
a q t t S - =  
The hazard increases if a > 1, decreases if a < 1, and reduces to exponential if a = 1. 
 





















When a > 1, the hazard first increases and then decreases. When 0 < a £ 1, the hazard 
increases with duration. 
 
•  Log-normal     [ ] ) ln( ) ( ) ( t t t f q a f a =      [ ] ) ln( ) ( t t S q a F =  
 
 
III.  ESTIMATION 
 
III.1.  Non-parametric analysis of the durations of periods without IMF agreement 
 
The non-parametric estimation techniques allow a first evaluation of the probabilities for the 
countries to remain without IMF agreement (survivor probabilities), without taking into 
account the other explanatory variables (i.e. the observable heterogeneity).  
 
The estimation with the Kaplan-Meier model is first performed on the sample with all the 
countries. Graph 3.1 shows that the cumulated probability to remain without an IMF 
agreement decreases sharply over time. This means that the rate of exit out of the status of 
country without agreement (the probability to sign an agreement), is increasing with time. 
Three cycles can be distinguished:  
(i)  a very strong growth of the exit rate for the first three years, if a country has 
experienced two years without IMF agreement, it has a cumulated probability of 
50% of signing an agreement during the third year;  
(ii)  a slow growth of the exit rate between three and 10 years, after nine years without 
agreement, the countries have a cumulated probability of 71% of exiting this 
situation and;  
(iii)  an even slower growth rate of the cumulated probability of exit beyond 10 years. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
 


















the beginning of 
the period





IMF agreement at 
the end of the 
period
Cumulated 
probability to exit 
at the end of the 
period
1 year 146 47 0.7123 0.2877
2 years 99 23 0.5468 0.4532
3 years 76 8 0.4965 0.5035
5 years 68 16 0.3861 0.6139
10 years 52 30 0.2869 0.7131
15 years 22 7 0.0549 0.9451
20 years 15 11 0.0329 0.9671
28 years 4 3 0.011 0.989
 
 
These tendencies are difficult to interpret at this stage of the analysis, because they can be the 
result of a non-linearity of the exit rates, as well as the result of not taking into account other 
explanatory variables (heterogeneity of the sample). In general, it seems that the longer 
African countries remain without IMF agreement, their cumulated probability to sign an 
agreement is higher, but the growth of the probability is increasingly slow. 
Survivors  (Kaplan-Meier) 
Duration of periods without IMF agreement (in years) 
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A classification of the durations based on certain characteristics of the countries allows going 
beyond the limits of this kind of analysis, by verifying whether the whole sample hides 
important disparities. The objective is to identify potential differences, by splitting the sample 
in two sub-groups with a dummy. With a rank order test, a conclusion can be made whether 
durations are significantly different between both sub-groups. The principle of the test is 
simple: for each sub-sample, the number of exits out of the status of country without 
agreement and the number estimated by the model for each period are taken into account. The 




The first criterion to split the sample is the number of months spent with an IMF agreement 
before the country ends up without an agreement. On average, the countries of the sample 
have experienced 46 months with an agreement before experiencing a period without and the 
median is 32 months. The sample is split into two sub-groups with a dummy equal to one, if 
the country, before the considered period without agreement, has experienced less than 32 
months with an agreement. The results of the test are as follow: 
 
Group  Event   Estimations 
Less than 32 months (nbmoiacd = 1)  71  85.19 
More than 32 months (nbmoiacd = 0)  58  43.81 
               c
2(1) = 9.97 
               Pr > c
2 = 0.0016 
 
The hypothesis that the two sub-groups have similar durations can be rejected with 99 percent 
confidence. Therefore, it seems appropriate to estimate the Kaplan-Meier model with the two 




Probability to remain without IMF agreement and number of months with agreement before 
 
Estimated survivor (Kaplan –Meier) / stratification: nbmoiacd 
Duration of periods without IMF agreement (in years)
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Graph 9.2 shows that those countries which had a longer period with an agreement also start a 
new agreement more quickly. The countries, which have experienced two years without IMF 
agreement, while having spent more than 32 months with an arrangement previously, have a 
cumulated probability of 69% to sign an agreement during the third year. This probability is 
only 34% if they have spent less than 32 months on an agreement previously. These figures 
suggest that there is an inertia effect or “learning by doing” effect, as described by Conway 
(1994) and Knight and Santaella (1997). Countries that have had Fund arrangements in the 
past are more likely to enter into an arrangement in a subsequent period. The reason might be 
that the authorities of a country are familiar with the Fund’s operating procedures because 
they have previously negotiated and implemented an arrangement. 
 
According to Bird (1995), it is also possible that some sort of “borrower’s threshold” exists. 
While they remain on one side of the threshold, countries will strongly resist borrowing from 
the Fund and will pursue a range of policies to avoid it. Once circumstances have caused them 
to enter into a Fund arrangement and they have crossed that threshold, the resistance to future 
borrowing is considerably reduced. With the political price of using the Fund being paid, the 
cost of future use is significantly reduced. It is also possible that there are other characteristics 
which both make a country more likely to have a long arrangement in the first place and more 
likely to sign a new arrangement more quickly. 
 
This latter hypothesis is examined by looking at a potential characteristic that may explain 
both factors. The second criterion used to split the sample is related to the structure of the 
society and more precisely to the ethnic diversity. Easterly and Levine (1997) used this 
characteristic to explain the weak economic performances of the African continent. They 
noticed that 14 of the countries with the highest diversity are located in Africa and that 
“Ethnic diversity may increase polarization and thereby impede agreement about the 
provision of public goods and create positive incentives for growth-reducing policies”. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) argued that society’s polarization and the degree of social conflict 
are key factors underlying policy decisions and therefore make it difficult to reach a political 
consensus about a program of reforms, when the population is very divided ethnically. The 
indicator of ethnic homogeneity chosen for our analysis is the index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (ETH). This index has been built by Tailor and Hudson (1972)
5 and 
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to 
different ethno-linguistic groups. Therefore, the scale of this index goes from 0 to 1, and the 
sample is split by creating a dummy ETH5 equal to 1, if the ETH index is lower than 0.5. 
 
                                                 
5 Derived from Soviet data collected in the early 1960s for the “Atlas Narodov Mira” (1964). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
 






















Graph 3.3 shows a cumulated survivor probability significantly lower for less ethically 
divided countries. Countries with an ethno-linguistic fractionalization index lower than 0.5, 
and with two years without IMF agreement, have a cumulated probability of 54% to sign a 
financial arrangement with the IMF during the third year. This probability is only 29% for the 
countries with a fractionalization rate over 0.5. However, after nine years without agreement, 
the ethno-linguistic fractionalization is no longer a significant factor for explaining periods 
without agreement. 
 
Those results give a first idea about the impact of some variables on the duration without IMF 
agreement. However, these results have to be qualified, because the estimation method used 
above doesn’t take into account the interdependence between the different variables. More 
elaborated models, such as parametric models, will allow the evaluation of the simultaneous 
impact of several exogenous variables. 
 
  
III.2.  Parametric analysis 
 
Non-parametric estimations provide a first analysis of the duration of periods without 
agreement with the IMF. However, they are limited to a succinct examination of these 
durations, since they do not control for the countries’ observable heterogeneity. The empirical 
work which has been done on this subject (Bird and Orme, 1981; Goldstein and Montiel, 
1986; Cornelius, 1987; Joyce, 1992; Conway, 1994; Bird, 1995; Knight and Santaella, 1997) 
concludes that exogenous variables do have a significant impact on a country’s decision to 
request IMF assistance, and therefore should not be left out. This section aims at examining 
the determinants of the duration of periods without IMF agreement. 
Estimated survivor (Kaplan-Meier) / stratification: eth5
Duration of periods without IMF agreement (in years) 
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III.2.a. Methodological specifications 
 
   The estimated models can be written as: 
 
  e b a + = - X t log   if specified as a proportional hazards model   
  and  0
* log log t X t + = b   if specified as an accelerated lifetime model.  
 
The estimated coefficients are  b  and 
* b . In the case of a proportional hazards  model, 
estimated with Cox’s method, the endogenous variable is  t log a - ; a positive value for  b  
means a higher exit probability and thus a shorter duration. On the other hand, in the case of 
an accelerated lifetime model, a positive value for the parameter 
* b  implies a longer duration 
(i.e. a lower exit probability). The estimation is performed by using the method of maximum 
likelihood, with specification of the likely distribution of  the survival time: Weibull, Log-
Normal, or Log-Logistic. 
 
The introduction of exogenous variables with changing values during the observation period 
adds a complication to the estimation of a duration model. So far the independent variables 
were assumed to measure constant characteristics over the observation period.  Kiefer (1988) 
notes regarding the introduction of time varying explanatory variables, that no simple 
interpretation of coefficients is possible in this case: “Identification is tricky, in that the effect 
of trending regressors is difficult to separate from possible duration dependence”. Thus for 
estimates to be precise, the time paths of regressors must vary substantially across individuals.      
 
Yet in the case of this study, many variables w ith potential influence on the decision to 
request an IMF arrangement have a value that changes on an annual basis. To bypass this 
practical problem of estimation and interpretation, the average value of these exogenous 
variables over the period without agreement has been introduced. Therefore, the coefficients 
of the variables will have to be interpreted as the coefficients of proxies of these variables 
(Petersen, 1986). 
 
For each country there are one or more observations (periods with no IMF agreement between 
1971 and 1998) constituting the endogenous variable, each observation being considered 




III.2.b. Exogenous variables  
 
The variables
6 introduced to explain the duration of periods of no agreement between the IMF 
and Sub-Saharan African countries will take into account three categories of determinants: the 
behavior of interest groups, the circumstances for a country to request an arrangement with 
the IMF, and the conditions for the IMF to supply financial assistance to this country. 
 
The behavior of interest groups. When negotiations between the IMF and a government are 
announced, it is not rare to observe demonstrations of interest groups against the financial 
arrangement due to their concern of its impact on domestic distribution of income (Sidell, 
                                                 
6 If not otherwise specified, data come from the World Bank’s African Development Indicators 2000. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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1988). The objective of the estimation of this duration model is to measure the extent of 
interest groups’ role in the process of concluding an agreement. Can interest groups delay a 
government from signing an agreement with the IMF and therefore extend the periods without 
agreement? The behavior of interest groups can have a double impact: a direct impact through 
lobbying the government and an indirect impact through supply and demand variables. 
Organized groups can, for instance, refuse to pay their fiscal liabilities. This will have an 
impact on the government’s fiscal revenue and therefore on the fiscal deficit, the reduction of 
which is a typical element of IMF’s ex ante conditions. 
 
There is no direct measure of the extent of rent-seeking activities. To take into account the 
influence of interest groups and their impact on the government’s choice, the factors which 
make their existence likely have been introduced. Two of those factors have been selected:
7 
the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ETH) and the share of illiterate population in the 
total population. 
 
The impact of ETH on the duration of periods with no IMF agreement is a priori ambiguous. 
The effect can be positive insofar as the domestic consensus necessary to implement an IMF 
reform program is more difficult to reach when the population is divided into groups with 
opposite interests. On the other hand, the fragmentation can reduce the duration of periods 
with no agreement if the government anticipates that the intervention of an external actor will 
provide the impetus necessary to implement reforms. The IMF has the capacity to “impose” 
reforms externally due to the conditions attached to its financial assistance. 
    
The variable “share of the illiterate population in the total population”
8 takes into account the 
capacity to mobilize the population to action. The assumption is that illiterate populations are 
easier for interest groups to mobilize against programs of reforms than educated populations. 
 
The variables of demand. Three kinds of variables for the circumstances for a country to 
request an arrangement with the IMF have been distinguished. The first category is the 
structural characteristics: GDP per capita, reflecting the level of development of the country; 
the size of the population (in logarithm) to take into account the size of the country; and the 
variation of the real effective exchange rate
9 between the beginning and the end of the period 
without agreement. The second category is the financial situation: the disbursements from the 
private sector (in percentage of GDP); the external debt service in percentage of exports of 
goods and services; and the foreign currency reserves measured in months of imports. The 
third category is related to the country’s prior experience with the IMF: the number of months 
spent with an IMF agreement before each period without an agreement. This last variable 
aims at verifying the existence of an inertia effect or of a borrower’s threshold observed in the 
non-parametric analysis, and by Conway (1994), Knight and Santaella (1997), and Bird 
(1995). 
                                                 
7 Other factors could have been used for this analysis. Svensson (2000), for instance, used an index of corruption 
as a proxy of rent-seeking activities. We were not able to do the same thing because of the lack of data over the 
1971-98 period, for the countries of our sample (Sub-Saharan African countries only). Other factors are highly 
correlated with high rent-seeking activities, but they all create problems with the other explanatory variables. 
The index “rule of law” has the same temporal and geographical limits as the index of corruption. Exports of 
primary commodities (except agricultural products) are highly correlated with foreign currency reserves, which 
is one variable among the variables of demand introduced in the duration model.   
8 The share of illiterate population has been chosen rather than the average number of years of education, 
because the latter is available only for a small number of Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1971-
1998.  
9 Units of local currency per US$. An increase of the REER means a real depreciation of the local currency.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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The variables of supply. Two sets of variables are used to take into account the determinants 
of supply of an arrangement by the IMF, i.e. the factors leading the IMF to conclude an 
agreement with a country and to agree to provide financial assistance. 
 
The first set of variables concerns the specific measures taken by the country. The decision-
making process inside the IMF consists mainly in assessing the government’s commitment to 
reform its economic policy in order to achieve fiscal and/or external equilibrium. The IMF 
has two means for this evaluation: the country’s promises expressed in the letter of intent 
presented to the IMF Board and the measures taken by the government prior to the financial 
arrangement being accepted by the IMF. In the framework of a duration model, it is difficult 
to take into account the promises. On the other hand, it is possible to measure some of the 
actions required by the IMF before the conclusion of an agreement. Among these actions, two 
have been selected: (i) the country’s fiscal policy, measured by the level of fiscal revenues in 
percentage of GDP for the last year of the period with no agreement
10 and (ii) the country’s 
exchange rate policy, measured by the variation of the nominal exchange rate
11 over the three 
months preceding the end of the period with no agreement. This last variable is a dummy 
equal to one, if the depreciation is above 15%. This threshold takes into account that 
devaluations were often one of the conditions imposed by the IMF before the signature of an 
arrangement for Sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
The second set of variables of supply is related to the political and institutional environment. 
The theoretical and empirical work done on this issue has mainly focused on : (i) the 
consequences of IMF programs on the political stability and on the evolution of the political 
regimes (Sidell, 1988; Bienen and Gersovitz, 1985; Herbst, 1990; Bathily, 1989) and (ii) the 
impact of the instability and the nature of political regimes on the performances of the country 
in implementing IMF programs (Haggard and Kaufman, 1989; Kaufman, 1986; Callaghy, 
1990). The alternative approach of this study is to test the assumption that countries with 
certain institutional and political characteristics have a higher probability to conclude an 
agreement with the IMF than other countries. These characteristics are included in the model 
with two variables:  
(i)  The nature of the political regime coming from the data set POLITY IV
12, which 
proposes an annual codification of the nature of the political authority. The 
indicator chosen is a composite indicator computed by subtracting an indicator of 
autocracy to an indicator of democracy.
13 The resulting unified polity scale ranges 
from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 
(ii)  The level of political instability coming from the data set “Political Instability” 
built by CERDI
14 and updated in 1999. This indicator measures the instability of 
                                                 
10 Or the average of annual ratios if the period is right-censored. 
11 Units of local currency per US$. An increase of the nominal exchange rate means a depreciation of the local 
currency. (Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF) 
12 Polity IV, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Program, University of Maryland. 
13 An autocracy is defined as a regime that sharply restricts or suppresses competitive political participation. Its 
chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office, they 
exercise power with few institutional constraints.  Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent 
elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective 
preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of power by executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens (Source: Polity IV, Dataset 
Users manual). 
14 Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International, University of Clermont-Ferrand, 
France. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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the executive power of the country. It enumerates and adds the events 
corresponding to legal political changes (elections, change of the executive chief) 
and illegal political changes (successful coups). The instability of the executive 
branch can  a priori have two opposite effects. It can delay the signature of an 
agreement because the IMF does not have a stable authorized negotiator or it can 
ease the conclusion of such an agreement if the change of regime offers a 
reopening of negotiations (Remmer, 1986). 
For these two variables, the values for the last year of the period with no agreement are 
included.
15 The objective is to verify whether a country has a higher probability to sign an 
agreement with the IMF, depending on whether its regime is more democratic or more 
autocratic and whether this country is experiencing political instability during the negotiations 
with the IMF.  
 
III.2.c. Results of estimations   
Table 3.2 presents the different estimations of the duration model with the three categories of 
explanatory variables. Given the constraint of the available data, the size of the sample has 
shrunk from 146 observations for the non-parametric analysis to 69 for the parametric 
analysis (See  Annex 1 for the composition of the sample). The results of the regressions 
confirm the significant influence of certain characteristics of the countries. The variable of 
political instability is the only one to be systematically insignificant. Moreover, depending on 
the probability distribution chosen, some variables are not significant: (i) the level of foreign 
reserves, the size of the population, the political regime and a multiplicative variable 
(fractionalization index * illiteracy rate) when the Cox semi-parametric estimation is used; (ii) 
the variation of the nominal exchange rate when the Weibull distribution is used; and (iii) the 
illiteracy rate when Weibull or Log-Normal are used. Excluding those differences of 
significance, the four models are relatively homogenous in estimating the effects of the 
exogenous variables. 
 
In order to evaluate the quality of these models, a Ramsey-Reset test was performed. This test 
provided information about whether some major explanatory variables are missing. Annex 2 
describes the procedure of the test and gives the results. According to the estimations, the 
assumption of missing explanatory variables can be rejected. As for the possible non-
observable heterogeneity, this eventuality was corrected by using the Gamma distribution
16. 
(See Annex 3). The econometric results show that the parameter signaling the presence of this 
kind of heterogeneity  (q) is not significant. This indicates that models without control of 
unobservable heterogeneity can be used. 
                                                 
15 or the annual average if the period is right-censored 
16 To correct this bias, the usual method is to assume that the individual densities depend on a heterogeneous 
element (which has a specific distribution) introduced among the explanatory variables. The distribution 
commonly used is the Gamma distribution:  
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Table 3.2 - Regression of duration models, 1971-98 
Regression N°  1  2  3  4 
  Cox
1  Weibull  Log Normal  Log Logistic 
Dependent variable  Duration of periods with no IMF agreement 
1. Variables of behavior of interest groups  
 
       































2. Variables of demand of agreement by the country 
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3. Variables of supply of agreement by the IMF  
 
       
•  Specific measures taken by the country 
 
       











Variation of the nominal exchange rate over the 3 months 











•  Institutional factors  
 

































Log of likelihood  
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T Student in brackets (after White’s correction)        *  significant at 10%       **  significant at 5% 
1 The coefficients show the effect on the exit probability out of the status of country without agreement. The signs of the coefficients are 
inversed compared to the signs of the other equations.  
2 Variation rate between the starting date and the ending date of the period without agreement. 
Units of local currency per US$.  
3 Index for the last year of the period without agreement and average of annual indices if the period is right-censored.  
4 Dummy = 1, if variation > 15% 
5 Index POLITY 98: scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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III.2.d. Interpretation of the results 
 
Generally, the coefficient of the variables has the expected sign. The influence of interest 
groups taken into account with the variable of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ETH) is a 
strongly significant negative determinant of the duration of periods without agreement. This 
confirms the hypothesis that a multitude of ethno-linguistic groups makes it difficult to reach 
a political consensus to implement a program of economic policy reforms (Alesina and 
Drazen, 1991). In such circumstances, the government has an incentive to request assistance 
from the IMF, not only to obtain financial support, but also to have the reforms imposed 
externally (Remmer, 1986; Putnam, 1988; Stein, 1992; Edwards and Santaella, 1993; and 
Bjork, 1995). For example, a government wishing to lower public spending, but facing strong 
opposition of the domestic constituencies, may enter into an IMF arrangement to tie the 
budget proposal to the conditions imposed by the IMF. This move raises the cost for the 
domestic constituencies of rejecting the proposed budget because a rejection of the 
government is also a rejection of the IMF arrangement. A rejection of the IMF will send a 
negative signal to creditors and investors which is costly to both the government and the 
domestic constituencies. By tying their hands with IMF conditionality, governments can 
increase their bargaining leverage with domestic interest groups opposed to economic reform 
(Vreeland, 1999; Pauly, 1997). 
 
Arcand, Guillaumont, and Guillaumont-Jeanneney (1999) assumed that it is ethnic 
polarization rather than ethnic fragmentation that is an obstacle to reform. Polarization is the 
case when there are two ethnic groups of equal size. It is also the case when there is one 
dominant group and several smaller groups likely to form a coalition that is capable of 
opposing the dominant group. An operational definition of polarization would be that it 
corresponds to a situation where the probability of confrontation between ethnic groups is 
high. This implies that the impact of ETH on the duration of periods with no agreement is not 
linear, but is an inverted U-shape. To test this hypothesis, ETH squared was introduced, but 
did not appear with a significant sign and thus was not kept in the final estimation.    
 
The illiteracy rate has the opposite impact of ETH. Its coefficient is significantly
17 positive, 
meaning that its effect on the duration of periods without agreement is positive (after 
controlling for GDP). Moreover, when associated with the illiteracy rate in a multiplicative 
variable, the impact of ETH changes and becomes positive as well. These results confirm the 
intuition that interest groups can more easily mobilize largely illiterate populations against 
reform programs because the rationale for these reforms is more difficult to explain to such 
populations. The utility of intervention of an external actor is considerably reduced when the 
official language of a country is understood by only a small share of the population (common 
in African countries with high illiteracy), aggravating the problems of communication.      
 
The variables of demand are very significant in explaining the duration of periods without 
agreement. The level of development, size of the country, disbursements from the private 
sector, level of foreign reserves, and depreciation of the real exchange rate have a positive 
impact, whereas the external debt service ratio has a negative impact. The larger and more 
developed a country, the easier it is to ride out external shocks and the less external support it 
needs from the IMF. The same argument applies to countries which (i) have a low debt 
service compared to their revenue from exports of goods and services, (ii) have a relatively 
high level of foreign reserves measured in months of imports, and (iii) experience a 
                                                 
17 Except in the case of estimation with Weibull and Log-Normal distributions. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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depreciation of their real effective exchange rate. The capacity to meet external obligations 
(debt service and imports) due to available foreign currencies is a positive factor  in 
lengthening the period without agreement with the IMF.   
 
There is no evidence in the data to support that IMF lending has a catalytic effect on private 
financial flows.
18 The results suggest that African countries do not request IMF credits as long 
as they receive sufficient private financial flows. These results can be interpreted in two ways. 
The countries turn to the IMF either: (i) to substitute public financial flows for private ones 
when they can no longer borrow on international financial markets; or (ii) to regain credibility 
and be able to borrow on international financial markets. In the case of Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the facts indicate that public financings, especially from concessional sources, were 
substituted for private flows when the risk of insolvency of African countries became too high 
during the 1980s and 1990s (OECD, 1988).  
 
The study also attempted to verify the existence of an IMF catalytic effect on other official 
financial flows (bilateral, World Bank, and other regional development banks). In order to be 
able to disburse external aid flows, most of these donors require the recipient countries to 
have an agreement with the IMF. The amount of undisbursed debt
19 from official creditors 
during the year preceding an agreement
20 was introduced in the regressions and was not found 
to be significant. This suggests that the existence of undisbursed financial commitments from 
other official donors is not a decisive incentive for a government to conclude an agreement 
with the IMF, after the impact of other factors has been taken into account.  
 
Furthermore, the estimated model shows that the phenomenon of “learning by doing”, or 
borrower’s threshold, is an important element to estimate the duration of periods without IMF 
agreement. In the non-parametric analysis, it was suggested that this effect may be due to 
other characteristics. After controlling for them, it is still there. The variable “number of 
months with an agreement before the period without agreement” appears with a strongly 
significant negative sign. This result indicates that the more time a country has spent with an 
IMF agreement, the shorter are subsequent periods without agreement. Therefore, signing an 
agreement with the IMF is easier for a country if previous agreements have been concluded. 
However, this conclusion has to be tempered, because this variable may also reflects the fact 
that for most countries the initial period was in the 1970s before the oil shock and before the 
Fund developed its lending program for developing countries.  
 
Other variables representing factors of demand were introduced in this estimation, but were 
not significant. In the case of the deficit of current accounts, the literature indicates that this 
variable is significant for samples consisting of all the developing countries (Bird and Orme, 
1981; Joyce, 1992; Conway, 1994; and Bird, 1995), but insignificant for samples including 
only Sub-Saharan African countries (Cornelius, 1987). The level of inflation, investment rate, 
and variation of terms of trade were not found to be significant either. 
 
The variables of supply, i.e. the elements taken into consideration by the IMF in approving an 
arrangement, have significant effects. The study finds that a country’s increase in fiscal 
                                                 
18 The studies conducted on this issue propose different conclusions. Bird and Orme (1981) and Bird (1995) 
show that IMF lending and private lending are complementary. This supports the hypothesis that IMF lending 
has a catalytic effect on private financial flows. On the other hand, Cornelius (1987) shows that these two 
sources of lending are substitutable in the case of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
19 Source: Global Development Finance, the World Bank.  
20 And the average of these amounts over the period if the observation is right-censored. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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revenues in addition to a nominal depreciation of its currency during a one-year period of no 
IMF agreement are strong indicators of entering into an agreement in the near future. The 
increase of revenues to decrease the fiscal deficit and the devaluation to improve the country’s 
export competitiveness are common IMF prior-actions for an arrangement. They are decisive 
elements for the approval of a program by the Fund’s Board. 
 
Institutional and political characteristics do not appear to be major determinants of the 
duration of periods without agreement. The variable of instability of the executive power is 
not significant. The variable of political regime is positive and slightly significant, suggesting 
that the more democratic a country, the higher its probability of concluding an agreement with 
the IMF. This weak link between institutional characteristics of a country and its probability 
of signing an agreement with the IMF has already been identified by Moore and Scaritt 
(1990) in the case of African countries. However, many other studies (among them Kaufman, 
1986; Haggard and Kaufman, 1989) have shown that autocratic regimes are more likely to 
conclude and successfully implement an IMF program than democratic regimes. According to 
its statutes, the IMF is not allowed to intervene in its members’ domestic politics. However, 
the IMF sometimes suspends programs when events change the nature of the political regime 
and this is seen to have important negative economic consequences, as was the case with Côte 




IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The parametric and non-parametric analyses of the duration of periods without agreement 
between the IMF and Sub-Saharan African countries provide information about the 
determinants of IMF financial arrangements. The economic characteristics of the countries are 
decisive. A country is less likely to request an IMF agreement and therefore is more likely to 
have longer periods without agreement if the country: (i) is relatively less exposed to external 
shocks because of its size and/or level of development, and (ii) is able to meet external 
obligations (imports and external debt service). 
 
The role of IMF pre-arrangement conditions has also been identified in this study. Countries 
which increase their fiscal revenue and devalue their currency during the last year of the 
period without agreement have a higher probability of concluding an arrangement with the 
IMF. In order to grant financial support, the Fund’s Board takes into account the countries’ 
first efforts to reform fiscal policy and exchange rate policy. 
 
Finally, the role of interest groups, especially ethno-linguistic groups, appeared clearly in the 
results of the econometric analyses. Their incapacity to reach a political consensus regarding a 
reform program accelerates the IMF intervention. As an external actor, the IMF is able to 
initiate and support such reforms with high political costs that a weak government could not 
implement alone. However, this IMF intervention is feasible only when the rationale is 
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Composition of the sample  






                                Date of the  
      Country        Code      periods with 
                No agreement 
     
  1.   Afrique du Sud          ZAF         jan84-?       
  2.            Benin          BEN      1971-may89      
  3.            Benin          BEN     jul92-dec92    
  4.         Botswana          BWA         1971-98      
  5.     Burkina Faso          BFA      1971-fev91    
  6.          Burundi          BDI     apr77-jul86      
  7.          Burundi          BDI         dec94-?     
  8.          Burundi          BDI     sep89-oct91      
  9.         Cameroun          CMR      1971-aug88     
 10.         Cameroun          CMR     jul90-nov91      
 11.         Cameroun          CMR     oct92-fev94     
 12.         Cameroun          CMR     oct96-jul97      
 13.            Congo          COG     jun92-apr94      
 14.            Congo          COG     jun95-may96      
 15.            Congo          COG     may80-jul86      
 16.            Congo          COG     may88-jul90      
 17.    Côte d'Ivoire          CIV     jan87-jan88     
 18.    Côte d'Ivoire          CIV     jul97-fev98    
 19.    Côte d'Ivoire          CIV     oct92-fev94    
 20.         Ethiopie          ETH     jul82-sep92      
 21.         Ethiopie          ETH     nov95-sep96      
 22.           Gambie          GMB      1971-apr77      
 23.           Gambie          GMB     dec80-jan82     
 24.           Gambie          GMB     dec91-mai98      
 25.           Gambie          GMB     jan85-aug86     
 26.           Gambie          GMB     jun78-oct79     
 27.           Gambie          GMB     mar83-mar84     
 28.            Ghana          GHA     avr92-mai95    
 29.            Ghana          GHA     jan86-sep86    
 30.            Kenya          KEN     apr93-nov93      
 31.            Kenya          KEN     jan95-mar96      
 32.            Kenya          KEN     mar86-jan88      
 33.          Lesotho          LSO      1971-may88     
 34.          Lesotho          LSO         oct97-?    
 35.       Madagascar          MDG     avr92-oct96    
 36.           Malawi          MWI      1971-sep79    
 37.           Malawi          MWI     avr94-oct94    
 38.           Malawi          MWI     dec85-fev88    
 39.             Mali          MLI     avr87-jul88    
 40.             Mali          MLI     sep91-jul92      
 41.          Maurice          MUS         sep86-?      
 42.       Mauritanie          MRT     fev98-jun99      
 43.       Mozambique          MOZ      1971-may87      
 44.            Niger          NER     avr95-mai96    
 45.            Niger          NER     jan92-fev94     
 46.          Nigeria          NGA      1971-dec86      
 47.          Nigeria          NGA     fev88-jan89      CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.01 
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 48.          Nigeria          NGA     mai90-dec90      
 49.          Nigeria          NGA         mai92-?      
 50.          Ouganda          UGA     oct84-mai87      
 51.              RCA          CAF     avr95-jun98      
 52.              RCA          CAF     jun90-fev94      
 53.          Senegal          SEN      1971-fev79     
 54.          Senegal          SEN     jan81-aug81      
 55.          Senegal          SEN     jan83-aug83      
 56.          Senegal          SEN     jul92-fev94      
 57.         Tanzanie          TZA     aug94-oct96      
 58.         Tanzanie          TZA     nov90-jun91      
 59.            Tchad          TCD      1971-sep87    
 60.            Tchad          TCD     nov90-fev94    
 61.             Togo          TGO         jul98-?    
 62.             Togo          TGO     mar93-aug94    
 63.             Togo          TGO     nov86-fev88      
 64.           Zambie          ZMB     jan85-jan86      
 65.           Zambie          ZMB     jun87-nov95      
 66.         Zimbabwe          ZWE      1971-mar81      
 67.         Zimbabwe          ZWE     mai82-fev83      
 68.         Zimbabwe          ZWE     oct84-dec91    
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The objective of the Ramsey-Reset test is to verify whether variables are missing. It evaluates 
the quality of specification of the estimated models. 
 
The statistic is calculated in three stages: 
1.  Estimation of the model to get the estimated value of the endogenous variable 
2.  Computation of the square of this estimated value 
3.  Introduction of this variable in the initial estimation. 
 
H0 : There is no missing variable  
H1 : There is missing variable(s)  
 
 
The statistic is: 
( )
( ) ( ) 1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 0 , K N K K F
K K SCR
K N SCR SCR





  with  SCR0 = sum of squared residuals of the initial regression  
SCR1 = sum of squared residuals of the second regression  
    N = number of observations  
    K0 = number of regressors in the initial equation  
    K1 = number of regressors in the second equation  
 
If  FC > FT, H0  is rejected and some missing  variables exist. 
 
 
On Stata 6, this test can be performed with the command "linktest". This procedure has been 
used to obtain the following results. The assumption H0 is rejected if the squared endogenous 




•  Model 1 
 
Cox regression    Number of obs  =  69 
Log likelihood = -209.92563                       
------------------------------------------------- 
duration |      Coef.    t  
---------+--------------------------------------- 
    _hat |   .0400622     0.054    
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•  Model 2 
 
 
Log-normal regression     Number of obs  =  69 
 
Log likelihood = -65.554574   
 
-------------------------------------------------- 
duration |      Coef.    t  
---------+---------------------------------------- 
    _hat |   .8610387     3.343    







•  Model 3 
 
 
Log-logistic regression    Number of obs =  69 
 
Log likelihood = -62.16789   
 
-------------------------------------------------- 
duration |      Coef.    t  
---------+---------------------------------------- 
    _hat |   .8334206     3.842    







•  Model 4 
 
 
Weibull regression     Number of obs  =  69 
 
Log likelihood = -63.192386   
 
-------------------------------------------------- 
duration |      Coef.    t  
---------+---------------------------------------- 
    _hat |   1.117728     5.813    
  _hatsq |   -.060874     -1.056   
-------------------------------------------------- 
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The differences in duration of periods without agreement might be caused by elements not 
captured by quantitative and qualitative variables. To take this eventuality into account, a 
random element representing this non-observable heterogeneity between individuals, is 
included. This random element is supposed to have a gamma distribution. The results 
obtained with this correction for the model 2 of table 2 are the following:    
 
             +---------------------------------------------+ 
              | Loglinear survival model: WEIBULL           | 
              | Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
              | Dependent variable             LDURATIO     | 
              | Weighting variable                  ONE     | 
              | Number of observations               69     | 
              | Iterations completed                 51     | 
              | Log likelihood function       -57.31098     | 
              | Censoring status variable is DEAD98         | 
              | Weibull Model with Gamma Heterogeneity      | 
              +---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
          RHS of hazard model 
 NBMOIACC  2.363256071      .23876530        9.898   .0000  63.227848 
 GDPCAP    .2058368549E-04  .70008297E-04    3.294   .0000  1370.3238 
 DBTSPRIV  9.621292276      2.9252515        4.554   .0000  .17148909E-01 
 DETSERV  -.5828126300E-01  .14634429E-02   -1.898   .0564  19.451055 
 RESERV    .5860281316E-02  .42833373E-01    1.777   .0658  2.2881933 
 LPOP      .9306346558E-01  .61752720E-01    1.807   .0513  15.540663 
 TCER      .0220298531      .00497750        8.443   .0000  1.6133396 
 RECFISC2 -.5876449879E-01  .11845418E-02   -3.496   .0000  21.607398 
 TXCHMEND -.1047579025      .50102683       -1.709   .0758  .47862483 
 POLITY   -.1283074064E-01  .12964830E-01    -.990   .3223 -2.2468354 
 INSTAB   -.4679000578E-01  .10633535        -.440   .6599  .51618445 
 ETH      -1.171957182      .33367470       -4.286   .0000  .69620253 
 ILLIT2    .2255256039E-02  .69971422E-02    1.322   .1472  53.560497 
 ETHIL2DE  .7533241129E-04  .10751197E-04    1.701   .0784  1546.2060 
 Constant -1.28421092       1.1456528       -1.121   .2623 
   
        Ancillary parameters for survival 
 Theta     10.17048878      10.319971         .586   .4644 
 Sigma     .6368114651E-01  .61490080E 
 
   
Theta is not significant, meaning non-observable heterogeneity does not exist. Therefore the 
correction is not necessary. 
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